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Joris LARIK*
Considering the implications of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) for the architecture of global (economic) governance, including the interna-
tional rule of law, the article addresses some of the most pertinent systemic consequences
TTIP is likely to produce, based on the shape the agreement is currently taking. The
article’s main arguments are that despite representing innovation and added value in
some areas, TTIP may produce negative consequences in at least three respects. Firstly,
it will cater to an imbalance in terms of access to justice in the area of investment
protection; secondly, by providing a way out for the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) two most active litigants, it can contribute to the de-judicialization of interna-
tional trade law; and thirdly, it creates potential for a ﬁerce backlash from the rest of the
world as regards the global promotion of an overtly transatlantic regulatory and norma-
tive agenda.
1 INTRODUCTION
Who, like us, ﬁrmly believes that globalisation needs to be framed by a clear set of rules on
everything from product safety to human rights? Which of those other top ﬁve world
economies will share our high standards of regulation, democracy, and the rule of law?
The United States.
And that’s why we need the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. To
strengthen our transatlantic partnership for long term!1
These are the words of European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner Cecilia
Malmström in a speech from February 2015, showing the EU’s hopes for the
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1 Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade, TTIP: Subsidiarity and Other Shared Transatlantic
Principles, Speech 5 (Brussels 12 Feb. 2015).
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to be not merely a transat-
lantic trade agreement, but an instrument to strengthen global governance and the
international rule of law.
TTIP has already caused vivid discussion among scholars as well as the
general public on speciﬁc substantive matters such as social and environmental
standards and democratic legitimacy.2 Taking into account a wider perspective
when two of the world’s major trade powers advance their own sophisticated
preferential trade regime, this article discusses a number of implications of
TTIP for the architecture of global (economic) governance, including the
international rule of law at large.
For the purposes of this article, governance is understood as involving ‘formal
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in
their interest’.3 Global governance, then, can best be understood as ‘the set of actors
that wield authority across national borders, including states that exercise authority
over other states (hierarchy), international organizations that possess authority over
their member states (supranationalism), and non-governmental organizations and
corporations that exert authority over communities located in two or more states
(private authority)’.4 This authority is not to be exercised in the narrow pursuit of
national or any other particular interests, but for ‘the management of global problems
and the pursuit of global objectives through concerted eﬀorts of states and other
international actors’.5
As regards the international rule of law, the article employs the term not only in
the ‘thin sense’, i.e. ‘a modest version of adhering to the rules’,6 but rather in the
‘thick’ sense, which includes also considerations of substantive justice on a global
scale.7 Closely connected to this is the role of international courts. They are under-
stood here not as mere abritrators, but as entities wielding ‘public authority’.8 As
2 See Stefan Martinić & Mihael Maljak, Certain Controversial Issues of EU-US Trade Negotiations Leading to
the Signing of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 10 Croatian Y.B. Eur. L. & Policy
341 (2014); Anne Meuwese, Constitutional Aspects of Regulatory Coherence in TTIP: An EU Perspective, 78
L. & Contemp. Probs. 153 (2015); and Luca Pantaleo, Wybe Douma & Tamara Takács, Introduction, in
Tiptoeing TTIP: What Kind of Agreement for What Kind of Partnership?, Centre for the Law of EU External
Relations Paper 2016/1, 11–13 (Luca Pantaleo, Wybe Douma & Tamara Takács eds., 2016) and the
various contributions contained the edited working paper.
3 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood 2 (Oxford University Press 1995).
4 David Lake, Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance, 54 Intl. Stud. Q.
587, 590 (2014).
5 MartinOrtega, Building the Future: The EU’s Contribution to Global Governance, EUISS Chaillot Paper No.
100, 46 (Apr. 2007).
6 George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought 11 (Oxford University Press 1996).
7 Brian Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law, in Relocating the Rule of Law 3–15, 4 (Gianluigi
Palombella & Neil Walker eds., Hart Publishing 2009).
8 See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International
Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2014).
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such, they are ‘multifunctional actors because they do much more than settling
disputes in concrete cases’,9 i.e. they ‘contribute to the stabilization and development
of the law, they make law through their decisions, and they review as well as
legitimize the authority exercised by other actors on diﬀerent levels of
government’.10
With this conceptual backdrop in mind, the article focuses on the systemic
consequences that TTIP, in its currently proposed form, is likely to produce. The
article argues that despite representing progress, innovation, and added value in some
areas, ﬁrstly, TTIP may cater to an imbalance in terms of access to justice in the area
of investment protection; secondly, it risks undermining international economic
governance structures, potentially contributing to the de-judicialization of interna-
tional trade law; and thirdly, it could prompt a backlash from third countries which
see themselves confronted with an ambitious ‘transatlantic duo’, exporting not only
goods, services, and capital on a large scale, but also developing regulatory standards
coupled with an overtly normative agenda, mostly under the guise of the new
chapter on ‘sustainable development’. Following some preliminary considerations
and a brief counterfactual exercise, the article addresses each of these points before
summing them up in a conclusion.
Before turning to the substantive part of the article, it is important to make two
preliminary disclaimers. Firstly, it needs to be stressed that – perhaps ‘hardened’ by
the experience of the long and rocky roads the EU at times needs to wander in order
to conclude wide-ranging international agreements – talking about TTIP is discuss-
ing more of a distant proposition than an imminent possibility.11 Even the most avid
TTIP-supporter cannot ignore the likelihood that even if the United States Congress
can bring itself to ratify TTIP, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)might still strike
it down as incompatible with the EU Treaties. Bluntly put, if TTIP is not killed on
Capitol Hill, it may still be shot down in Luxembourg. Moreover, should TTIP be
concluded as a mixed agreement, it would require ratiﬁcation by all EU Member
States, which hands each of them a national veto to stop the agreement from entering
into force. Secondly, being under negotiations in politically tumultuous times, TTIP
represents a moving target for analysis (post-Brexit vote, so does the EU, also as a
9 Ingo Venzke, On the Functions, Authority and Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration: The Case of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in Tiptoeing TTIP: What Kind of Agreement for What
Kind of Partnership?, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations Paper 2016/1, 59–75, 60 (Luca
Pantaleo, Wybe Douma & Tamara Takács eds., 2016).
10 Ibid.
11 Examples in this vein include the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the European Patent
Court, and the still ongoing accession process to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). See for a critical overview Bruno de Witte, A Selﬁsh Court? The Court of Justice and the
Design of International Dispute Settlement Beyond the European Union, in The European Court of Justice and
External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges 33–46 (Marise Cremona and Anne Thies eds., Hart
Publishing 2014).
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contracting partner in international trade agreements). Hence, it is important to
acknowledge that the appraisal oﬀered here is based on the textual proposals made
available by the European Commission, stemming from 2015. On the one hand, this
should reﬂect the latest state of play in the negotiations and adaptations to public
concerns. On the other, these are not ﬁnal texts and may yet see signiﬁcant change,
not least as the US counterpart will weigh in on these proposals.
2 A BRIEF COUNTERFACTUAL EXERCISE
In order to take a step back from the countless technical details of trade negotiations
and with a view to putting things in perspective, it may be worthwhile to embark on
a brief exercise in counterfactual history. Imagine that TTIP would have been
concluded after the Second World War, once the Western European economies
were in suﬃciently good shape to open their markets, as an agreement arguably
between the United States, Western European countries, and perhaps even the
ﬂedgling European Communities. This would have amounted to a quantum leap
in transatlantic cooperation. It would have completed what International Relations
scholars call the ‘transatlantic bargain’,12 with both military and economic coopera-
tion on a transatlantic scale. Moreover, given that in the multilateral context (sans the
Communist bloc) there was only the non-judicial, entirely member-driven General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), a post-war TTIP with inter-party dispute
settlement and an investment court would also have represented a signiﬁcant qua-
litative advancement in international economic governance, albeit among a limited
number of participants.
If we fast-forward to the early 1990s and the advent of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), what would it have meant to have concluded TTIP at the
same time? At ﬁrst glance, the content would have ﬁt the narrative of the ‘New
World Order’, but its limited participation would not. It may well have taken the
wind out of the sails of the Uruguay Round, and its watershed package deal on
making the international trading regime more rules-based, above all through the
establishment of quasi-judicial dispute settlement topped oﬀ by an Appellate Body.
TTIPwould have been a kind of Blair House Agreement that mattered to theUnited
States and Europe only, leaving the rest of the world as spectators. At the dawn of the
post-Cold War era, it would have felt anachronistic to establish this sort of ‘Trade
NATO’.
Returning to the present – or rather a somewhat distant future paved with
numerous US Senate debates, judgments of the CJEU, and public discourse
12 See Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain
Challenged 1 (2d ed., Rowman & Littleﬁeld 2005).
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lamenting the loss of sovereignty and autonomy –what would it mean to see TTIP
ratiﬁed and enter into force for global economic governance at large? Certainly,
TTIP has great potential to advance free trade, regulatory cooperation and trans-
parency among its parties. Moreover, it would draw most of ‘the West’ more
closely together. However, it would also represent a step back for global economic
governance in at least three regards, on which the following sections elaborate, i.e.
contributing to an imbalance in access to justice for foreign investors, undermining
the WTO and its compulsory dispute settlement system, and, regarding United
States and EU foreign policy at large, risking to be perceived as imposing Western
norms on the rest of the world rather than bolstering universal norms and institu-
tions of global governance. The following three sections focus on these concerns
based on the textual proposals currently available.
3 TTIP AND INVESTMENT PROTECTION
Of the three features of TTIP on which this article focusses, the envisaged
investment court system (ICS) represents the one that is most innovative and
beneﬁcial to the rule of law in international economic governance. However,
this will both cause tensions with the special characteristics of EU law and
grant wider access to justice in a selective way, i.e. to foreign investors only.
Investor-state dispute settlement, much less the new ICS, does not have an
equivalent at the WTO. There, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) exists, but with only states as possible parties to disputes.
Instead, in contemporary international economic governance investor-state dis-
pute settlement is mostly carried out on the basis of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs). A Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiated in the 1990s
was never ratiﬁed.13 The EU, which after the Lisbon Treaty pursues an invest-
ment policy as part of the Common Commercial Policy, is in the process of
gradually replacing the numerous BITs concluded by its Member States.14 The
prospect of investor-state dispute settlement under TTIP has been met with
ﬁerce criticism in the public discourse, based on concerns about democracy and
the upholding of socio-economic and environmental standards.15 This has led to
13 SeeRiyaz Batlu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement
on Investment, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 275 (2000–2001).
14 N. Jansen Calamita,TheMaking of Europe’s International Investment Policy: Uncertain First Steps, 39 L.I.E.I.
301 (2012).
15 See for this line of argumentation, e.g. an op-ed written by ten European health, transparency and
environmental NGOs entitled TTIP Puts the EU’s Environmental and Social Policies on the Line, EurActiv,
13 Jan. 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/opinion/ttip-puts-the-eu-s-environ
mental-and-social-policies-on-the-line/ (accessed 23 Apr. 2016); and further Mark Weaver, The
CRITIQUING TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 427
some modiﬁcations, which are reﬂected in the EU’s textual proposal made
public on 12 November 2015.16
Unlike inter-party dispute settlement (see next section), a two-tier system is
envisaged with a ‘Tribunal of First Instance’ and an ‘Appeal Tribunal’ – the latter
not being provided under traditional BITs. Furthermore, eﬀorts are made to
safeguard the autonomy of parties’ legal orders, arguably in an attempt to assuage
both public opinion as well as sovereignty concerns of domestic political and
judicial institutions.
The revised proposal on the ICS is both innovative and, to some extent,
responsive to legal, political, and public concerns.17 If the ICS survives the likely a
priori review at CJEU, it will represent progress in terms of ‘judicialization’ and access
to justice, especially since it moves beyond theWTOmodel under which only states
(and the EU) can be parties to dispute settlement proceedings.
However, it remains doubtful that TTIP, if it included the investment chapter as
currently proposed by the European Commission, would stand up to scrutiny at the
CJEU, not least in view of Opinion 2/13. There, the Court found that the EU could
not become a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
because the accession agreement, which provided for both a co-respondent mechan-
ism and the possibility for prior referral to the CJEU, did not suﬃciently safeguard
the autonomy of the EU legal order.18 Under the ICS proposal, similar issues arise, i.
e. as to whether the EU and its Member States will be parties to disputes,19 which
involves procedures for the determination of the proper respondent,20 and as to
whether treatment was ‘aﬀorded exclusively’ by a Member State or not.21
The textual proposal of November 2015 does not provide explicitly for any
involvement of the CJEU. It does, however, stress that ‘the domestic law of the
Parties shall not be part of the applicable law’ of the investment tribunals,22 which
would include EU law. Instead, it states that the tribunals shall treat domestic law ‘as a
Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS Provisions, Reconciliation, and Future
Trade Implications, 29 Emory Int’l L.Rev. 225, 253–254 (2014–2015).
16 European Commission, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-
Commerce, tabled for discussion with the United States and made public on 12 Nov. 2015, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2016).
17 See on the merits of the ICS also Luca Pantaleo, Lights and Shadows of the TTIP Investment Court System,
in Tiptoeing TTIP: What Kind of Agreement for What Kind of Partnership?, Centre for the Law of EU
External Relations Paper 2016/1, 77–92, 78–85 (Luca Pantaleo, Wybe Douma & Tamara Takács eds.,
2016).
18 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; see further Tobias Lock, The Future of the European Union’s Accession to
the European Convention on Human Rights After Opinion 2/13: Is It Still Possible and Is It Still Desirable?, 11
EuConst 239 (2015).
19 European Commission, supra n. 16, s. 3, Art. 1(2).
20 Ibid., s. 3, Art. 5.
21 Ibid., s. 3, Art. 4(4).
22 Ibid., s. 3, Art. 13(3).
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matter of fact’,23 that in doing so they ‘shall follow the prevailing interpretation of
that provisionmade by the courts or authorities of that Party’,24 and that the meaning
they may give to such law ‘shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of
either Party’.25 Future changes to the proposal could include a default procedure for
determining the respondent and further safeguards. Whether this all will assuage the
CJEU in its assessment of compatibility with the EU Treaties remains questionable.
Even if considered compatible with EU law and eventually operational, a point
of criticism, or at least a question as to its necessity, will remain regarding the ICS. In
terms of the rule of law, the ICS proposal provides additional access to justice, but
only in a selective way. With the ICS, ‘a speciﬁc type of remedy is created for the
additional protection oﬀered to foreign investors’26 between developed economies.
This remedy is aﬀorded in a particular forum to a particular category of claimants,
most likely large corporations. As regards claims before national or EU courts relying
on TTIP, brought by either foreign investors or domestic corporations and indivi-
duals, these will likely be thwarted by denying direct eﬀect of TTIP explicitly in the
agreement, as is the case in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between the EU and Canada as well as other recent free trade agreements
(FTAs).27
In sum, TTIP at the moment would contribute to global economic governance
by providing new sophisticated institutions at the mega-regional level, which are not
available at the multilateral level, and by widening access to justice. However, it
remains an open question whether the CJEU will accept this innovation as compa-
tible with EU law. Equally questionable remains whether it is necessary to increase
access to justice to this particular class of actors in a special venue detached from the
national and EU legal orders.
4 TTIP AND INTER-PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The clamour, not least in the media and in public discourse, surrounding investment
protection under TTIP should not overshadow inter-party dispute settlement as
envisaged by TTIP and its relationship with the multilateral sphere. Inter-party
dispute settlement raises two prospects, neither of which is very attractive for global
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., s. 3, Art. 13(3).
25 Ibid., s. 3, Art. 13(4).
26 Marise Cremona,Guest Editorial: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 52
CML Rev. 351, 359 (2015).
27 See the text in the version following the legal review conducted by the Canadian Government and the
European Commission, Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Art. 30.6, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2016); and Cremona,
supra n. 26, at 359–360.
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economic governance. One option, the more pessimistic one, is that TTIP could
strike at the quasi-judicial compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.
The latter is one of the most successful instances of dispute settlement in the
international legal order, aptly described as being ‘at the heart of theWTO system’.28
The other – arguably more realistic – option is that the EU and United States will
leave unapplied TTIP dispute settlement provisions and continue to avail themselves
of theWTO, which would raise questions as to the added value of TTIP in terms of a
contribution to rules-based trade governance.
The United States and the EU are the two most active users of WTO dispute
settlement. To date, the United States has acted as a complainant in 109 cases at the
WTO, while being a respondent in 126. The EU has been a complainant in 96 cases
and respondent in 82. Both have faced each other in 52 cases.29 By concluding TTIP,
both trading powers could possibly be taking themselves out of WTO dispute
settlement as far as their bilateral trade relations are concerned. While this would
certainly lessen the pressure on the docket in Geneva, it might slow down the
development of international economic law and constitute an important step
towards the de-judicialization of international trade dispute settlement as more
deep and comprehensive FTAs and mega-regionals are on the horizon.
According to the EU’s textual proposal, TTIP is to have a compulsory dispute
settlement mechanism between its parties, i.e. the responding party’s consent is not
necessary in order for jurisdiction to be established. In terms of enforcement, a
supervised system of suspension of concessions is foreseen to induce compliance.30
It is not entirely clear from the text which entities will be the possible parties to these
disputes. The proposal refers to ‘Government to Government’ and at this time it is
not clear whether TTIP will or will not be a ‘mixed agreement’, i.e. whether it will
include both the Union and the Member States as parties.31 According to the EU’s
textual proposal, more precisely its Annex I on Rules of Procedure, ‘[u]nless the
Parties agree otherwise, the hearing shall be held in Brussels if the complaining Party
is the US and in [Washington, D.C.] if the complaining Party is the EU.’32 This
28 Former WTO Director-General Ruggiero cited in Meinhard Hilf & Tim René Salomon, Running in
Circles: Regionalism in World Trade and How It Will Lead Back to Multilateralism, in From Bilateralism to
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma 257–268, 264 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds.,
Oxford University Press 2011).
29 These numbers are taken from the ‘Find disputes cases’ interface on the WTO website: https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ﬁnd_dispu_cases_e.htm results (accessed 22 Apr. 2016).
30 European Commission, Textual Proposal: Dispute Settlement, tabled for discussion with the United States
in the negotiating round of 10–14 Mar. 2014 and made public on 7 Jan. 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153032.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2016).
31 The pendingOpinion 2/15, requested by the European Commission under Art. 218(11) TFEU, should
help to clarify this matter. See also Pieter Jan Kuijper, Some Final Questions and Conclusions, in Tiptoeing
TTIP: What Kind of Agreement for What Kind of Partnership?, Centre for the Law of EU External
Relations Paper 2016/1, 93–101, 99 (Luca Pantaleo, Wybe Douma & Tamara Takács eds., 2016).
32 European Commission, supra n. 30, Annex I: Rules of Procedure, pt. 23.
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would suggest that each dispute would be United States versus the EU, or vice versa.
This would also be consistent with practice under the WTO, where the EU has
always taken up cases launched against individual Member States, including in areas
which at the time fell outside of the EU’s exclusive competence.33
Based on the EU’s proposal, to which extent is this a step forward for global
economic governance and the rule of law? Is it a mega-regional innovation designed
to take trade dispute settlement to the next level and enforce the more advanced rules
under TTIP? That remains highly doubtful. Firstly, unlikeWTO dispute settlement,
there is no appellate mechanism under the current proposal for inter-party dispute
settlement under TTIP, in contrast to the new ICS. It is basically a one-shot
arbitration. Considering that ‘appellate review adds an accelerating dynamic to
judicial lawmaking and is likely to increase not only legal certainty, but also judicial
authority’,34 the lack of an appellate instance may be detrimental to the future
consistency and coherent development of what could become known as ‘TTIP law’.
Moreover, inter-party dispute settlement under TTIP creates a venue choice
between WTO or TTIP dispute settlement for the EU and the United States.35
This is a priori not a negative development, as ﬁnding judicial instances with
jurisdiction in international law – not least in cases involving the United States –
is no mean feat. The recent obstruction by the United States of the reappointment
of an Appellate Body member despite ﬁerce criticism from other WTO members
only reminds us not to take the achievement of WTO dispute settlement for
granted.36 Nevertheless, it raises questions about the relationship with the law
and jurisprudence of the WTO.
According to the EU’s textual proposal, the article on ‘Rules of Interpretation’
states that the ‘panel shall also take into account relevant interpretations in reports of
panels and the Appellate Body adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’.37
This diﬀers from the analogous provisions in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP), a
trade agreement between the United States and eleven other countries of the Paciﬁc
Rim. According to the relevant provision on TPP dispute settlement, ‘[w]ith respect to
any provision of the WTO Agreement that has been incorporated into this Agreement, the
33 See e.g. Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, Ireland—Measures Aﬀecting the Grant of Copyright,
WT/DS82/3 and European Communities—Measures Aﬀecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights, WT/DS115/3, 13 Sept. 2002; for more examples see Andrés Delgado Casteleiro & Joris Larik,
The ‘Odd Couple’: The Responsibility of the EU at the WTO, in The International Responsibility of the
European Union 233–255 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., Hart Publishing 2013).
34 Venzke, supra n. 9, at 61.
35 See European Commission, supra n. 30, Art. 23 containing the relevant ‘fork in the road’ clause.
36 WTOMembers Debate Appointment/Reappointment of Appellate BodyMembers,WTONews Item, 23May
2016, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dsb_23may16_e.htm (accessed 19 June
2016).
37 European Commission, supra n. 30, Art. 20.
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panel shall also consider relevant interpretations in reports of panels and the WTO
Appellate Body adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.’38
In the case of TPP, where provisions have been taken over directly from the
WTO Agreements, the interpretation through WTO case law of these provisions
shall be considered. In the case of TTIP, the duty to draw onWTO case law is more
ambiguous. It will be up to the respective TTIP panels to decide what is ‘relevant’,
with no appellate instance to aid in the creation of guidelines as how to ensure
‘WTO-consistent’ interpretationwhere appropriate, or when to develop – to use the
EU law term – ‘autonomous’ interpretations of TTIP provisions. In any event, in
both the TTIP and TPP as they currently stand, there is no obligation to actually
follow WTO case law; they are merely to be taken into account and considered,
respectively.
While raising this spectre of ‘fragmentation’ of international trade law may
admittedly remain of rather limited practical import, looking at practice under
bilateral FTAs, however, may paint a diﬀerent kind of gloomy picture as regards
the rule of law in international economic governance. Where compulsory dispute
settlement exists under such agreements, it is rarely used.39 Why would TTIP be
diﬀerent? In case it will operate like most other FTAs, from a practical point of
view the inter-party dispute settlement provisions prove to be virtually nugatory.
Hence, there is a good chance that the opportunity will very rarely arise for panels
to be able to engage in exercises of interpreting TTIP provisions. A dense and
coherent body of ‘TTIP law’ may never arise. Moreover, as long as the parties do
not make use of dispute settlement, not even a ‘muted dialogue’40 can be had
between the existing WTO and the prospective TTIP legal spheres in order to
clarify their relationship.
Disputes, instead, will be resolved through diplomatic backroom deals, with no
open judicial process and without a resulting decision based on legal reasoning.41
38 TPP was signed on 4 Feb. 2016. The legally veriﬁed text of the agreement was released on 26 Jan. 2016.
Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership, Art. 28.12 (emphasis added), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_secured
ﬁles/Trans-Paciﬁc-Partnership/Text/28.-Dispute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2016).
39 Claude Chase, Alan Yanovich, Jo-Ann Crawford & Pamela Ugaz, Mapping Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements: Innovative or Variations on a Theme?, WTO Economic
Research and Statistics Division, StaﬀWorking Paper, 46–49 (World Trade Organization 2013), http
s://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201307_e.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2016); and further
William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment, in Regional Trade Agreements
and the WTO Legal System 343–357 (Lorand Bartels & Frederico Ortino eds., Oxford University Press
2006).
40 Marco Bronckers, From ‘Direct Eﬀect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’: Recent Developments in the European Courts’
Case Law on the WTO and Beyond, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 885 (2008).
41 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would be an example of an FTAwith a dispute
settlement mechanism, which is being used for cases that cannot be amicably resolved. However,
practice here is largely limited to anti-dumping cases (as well as investor-state disputes). SeeMarc Froese,
Regional Trade Agreements and the Paradox of Dispute Settlement, 11 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. 367, 380
(2014).
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Optimistically speaking, perhaps such disputes can all be solved amicably – though
the history of the United States and EU in theWTOwould suggest diﬀerently. Even
then, no contributions are made to the development of either ‘TTIP law’ or of
international trade law at large through building and reﬁning an acquis of judicial
decisions as an exercise of public authority. Of course, the EU and United States
could continue to bring cases under WTO dispute settlement, but these would
concern existing WTO law, and not TTIP or other FTAs. While TTIP would not
be undermining WTO dispute settlement in this scenario, it would not add value
either in terms of rules-based global economic governance.
In sum, not only could the WTO be deprived of future case law prompted
by the United States and EU, it likely would not even lead to new case law
under the umbrella of TTIP. Both transatlantic and multilateral economic
governance, consequently, is likely to be much more member-driven and
much less rules-based.
5 TTIP AND ‘SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT’
As the third and ﬁnal point of concern this article turns to is the normative agenda
that TTIP is to embrace, as it appears in the EU’s textual proposal on ‘Trade and
Sustainable Development’ of 6 November 2015.42 This agenda goes far beyond both
traditional or even new trade issues,43 and is concerned rather with global govern-
ance and the promotion of international norms in general. The proposal stresses ‘the
beneﬁt of considering trade and investment-related labour and environmental issues
as part of a global approach to trade and sustainable development.’44 Substantive areas
include labour rights, environmental aspects, health, and corporate social responsi-
bility. There are areas which are not only likely to stir up political controversies in the
United States, in particular in Congress, but also to create a backlash from the ‘non-
TTIP’ world.
In addition to the domestic scrutiny which TTIP is prone to face, the sustainable
development chapter of TTIP can at ﬁrst glance be seen as a contribution to the
realization of the EU’s foreign policy objectives as enshrined in its constitutional
documents.45 In the post-Lisbon EU Treaties, the speciﬁc objectives of the
Common Commercial Policy, stipulated in Article 206 TFEU, have to be read ‘in
42 European Commission, Textual Proposal: Trade and Sustainable Development, tabled for discussion with
theUnited States in the negotiating round of 19–23Oct. 2015 andmade public on 6Nov. 2015, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2016).
43 Compare with the less extensive Ch. 22 on Trade and Sustainable Development of the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra n. 27.
44 European Commission supra n. 42, Art. 1(3).
45 See further Joris Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press
2016).
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the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’46 at large.
Hence, the call for ‘free and fair trade’ in Article 3(5) TEU needs to be considered
together with calls for ‘sustainable development of the Earth’, the promotion of
human rights, democracy and the ‘strict observance and the development of inter-
national law’ and other tenets enshrined in that same article. TTIP, then, can be
understood as a vehicle to contribute to these substantive normative goals.
Moreover, there is a strong systemic, multilateral dimension to the EU’s con-
stitutional foreign policy mandate. In this regard, TTIP’s positive contribution is
more doubtful – unless one is completely captivated by the ‘stepping stone’ narrative
on FTAs. Of particular relevance from this point of view are the following objectives
contained in Article 21 TEU which aim at improving global governance and its
institutions, i.e. building ‘partnerships with third countries, and international, regio-
nal or global organizations which share’ the EU’s principles, the promotion of
‘multilateral solutions to common problems’47 and ‘an international system based
on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’.48 Themultilateral
dimension is also echoed in high-level policy documents and public speeches. The
EU’s Global Europe strategy of 2006 stresses that theUnion’s priority is the pursuit of
‘an ambitious, balanced and just multilateral agreement to liberalise international
trade further’.49 The strategy goes on to note that the best way to achieve this is
through the WTO as ‘a rules-based system, and a cornerstone of the multilateral
system’.50 In this same spirit, a decade later, the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign
and Security Policy of June 2016 stresses that TTIP is a sign of transatlantic ‘will-
ingness to pursue an ambitious rules-based trade agenda’51 and notes that the ‘EU
will ensure that all its trade agreements are pursued in a manner that supports
returning the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to the centre of global
negotiations.’52
In the textual proposal for TTIP’s chapter on sustainable development, there is a
clear emphasis on normative, rules-based approaches, in particular the ratiﬁcation
and implementation of international treaties by the parties.53 This is likely an
46 Art. 207(1) TFEU.
47 Art. 21(1), second subpara. TEU.
48 Art. 21(2)(h) TEU.
49 European Commission, Global Europe – Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and
Jobs Strategy (Brussels 4 Oct. 2006), COM(2006) 567 ﬁnal, 2.
50 Ibid.
51 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign
and Security Policy, 37 (June 2016).
52 Ibid., at 41.
53 See European Commission, supra n. 42, Art. 4(2)(b) on ratiﬁcation and Art. 4(4) on implementation of
fundamental Conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and their Protocols; Art. 10
(3) onmultilateral environmental agreements; and Art. 14(2)(b) on trade and sustainable management of
ﬁsheries and aquaculture products.
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expression of the EU’s stronger emphasis on – and trust in – international law, setting
TTIP apart fromTPP. The latter, though it addresses similar norms, does not contain
the manifold references to international treaties and conventions in any explicit
terms.
The proposal speciﬁcally mentions, among others, a number of treaties which
the United States thus far has not ratiﬁed, such as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities
(CRPD) as well as a number of environmental agreements. The proposal further-
more calls for the ‘worldwide promotion’ by United States and EU of numerous
treaties and the norms they contain in the area of labour aspects of trade and
sustainable development, ‘in particular through promoting adherence to relevant
international instruments, including with regard to ratiﬁcation where appropriate, as
well as participation in relevant international processes and initiatives’.54
However, the ‘worldwide promotion’ of this wider normative agenda may not
only become a red ﬂag for the American side, in particular Congress, but also create a
backlash from other parts of the world. As research on the EU as a global actor has
shown, and in contrast to the EU’s self-image, there is little ‘evidence of the EU
being widely seen as a “normative power” exporting universal values of democracy
and human rights’,55 not least as regards the emerging BRICS countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the ‘Global South’ in general.56 Against
this backdrop, such contestation may be further encouraged rather than abate if the
‘transatlantic duo’ of United States and EU were to use TTIP as the launch pad for
jointly pursuing this normative agenda as part of a package of standards and regula-
tions the rest of the world is to follow, and the universality of which is postulated
rather than grown at the multilateral level.
6 CONCLUSION: TTIP AS A BRAVE NEW ANACHRONISM
Just because one may accept the overall rationale for deep trade agreements and the
degree of innovation that TTIP might provide in a number of areas does not mean
54 Ibid., Art. 5(3)(h) on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; see alsoArt. 6(3)(c) on
elimination of forced or compulsory labour; Art. 7(3)(e) on the eﬀective abolition of child labour; and
Art. 8(3)(f) on equality and non-discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; see alsoArt. 9
(g) on ‘cooperation with and in third countries’ regarding ILO core labour standards; and Art. 11(2)(c)
on cooperation regarding the protection of biodiversity and other environmental aspects ‘at the
bilateral, regional and global levels’.
55 Sonia Lucarelli, The European Union in the Eyes of Others: Towards Filling a Gap in the Literature, 12 E.F.A.
Rev. 249, 269 (2007).
56 See Lisbeth Aggestam,Global Norms and European Power, inRoutledge Handbook on the European Union and
International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power 457–471, 465–466 (Knud Erik Jørgensen & Katie
Verlin Laatikainen eds., Routledge 2013).
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one cannot be concerned about the shape TTIP will take and the implications this
will have for global governance and the international rule of law. In other words, the
road to TTIP may well be paved with good intentions, but we should stay alert to
where it might lead. Based on the contours of TTIP as they become visible through
the textual proposals 2015, the following conclusions can be summarized.
If TTIP had been concluded any time before 1994, it would have been a giant
leap in transatlantic relations and an ambitious, potentially inspiring model for the
rest of the world. More than two decades later, a new environment has emerged in
which TTIP can still bring some added value, not least considering lacking progress
in multilateral trade governance, of which the gridlocked Doha Round has become
the epitome. However, in the aspects outlined here, TTIP may actually result in a
step backward from the remarkable progress which has been achieved under the
auspices of the WTO to date. In these respects, TTIP appears rather as a ‘brave new
anachronism’.
Firstly, the revamped ICS is, compared to the WTO, an increase in access to
justice in the area of international trade governance. The introduction of an appellate
instance, moreover, can contribute to legal certainty and coherence. However, it is
an unbalanced innovation in the sense that it is limited to foreign investors.
Secondly, and more troublesome, is TTIP’s inter-party dispute settlement
system, which could serve as a way out for the WTO’s two most active litigants,
draining momentum from the development, reﬁnement, and legitimacy of interna-
tional trade jurisprudence. Whether such a loss would be oﬀset by a new acquis of
‘TTIP case law’ is highly doubtful given the practice – or rather lack thereof – under
existing FTAs. Instead, dispute settlement under TTIP would likely follow a more
member-driven than rules-based approach.
Thirdly, the ambitious normative agenda contained in the proposed part on
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ puts an emphasis on international treaties and
pursuing the global implementation of norms beyond traditional trade issues. While
this conforms at least to the EU’s self-image as power promoting universal norms,
this perception is not shared in the rest of the world – perhaps not even in the United
States to begin with. In the ‘non-TTIP world’, in the future, there will be a danger
that TTIP is seen as catering to anachronistic notions of Western regulatory and
value promotion under the guise of ‘sustainable development’.
TTIP will face some tough struggles – in Washington, in Luxembourg, and
probably in the EUMember State capitals – before it can enter into force. But that is
only half the story. In order to contribute to advancing global economic governance
and the rule of law, it will have to stand up, moreover, to scrutiny beyond the
political and judicial institutions on both sides of the North Atlantic.
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